What can be learned with the tools of game theory about the decision-making processes in the distribution of vaccines against Corona to the developing world? A conversation with Prof. Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan from the Federmann School of Public Policy and Government, and Prof. Adam Lampert from the Faculty of Agriculture at the Hebrew University. After a year of the corona epidemic - a vaccine is developed. Of course, only the rich countries could afford it. But what about the rest of the world? As we know, the World Health Organization tried to organize a vaccine donation mechanism from the world's richest countries, but the mission failed. Less than 15 percent of the target was achieved. In an epidemic, it seems, there is no solidarity.

Could the rich and developed countries behave in a different way, which would not harm their ability to vaccinate their citizens, and at the same time would be beneficial to the residents of the poor countries? Can a country be expected to donate its vaccines when it is not known whether and when another variant of the disease will arrive? How effective is it to store vaccines? Is a broad apply, to everyone who can, more effective than a more specific apply?

In this Hujicast episode, a conversation with Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Lampert tried to answer this question using tools from the field of game theory and decision-making. According to their research, it was possible to create a mechanism in which rich countries could donate much more vaccines, even in situations of uncertainty about the future, and it is very possible that a different form of appeal to the countries could have produced a completely different result. If only we could turn back time... Let's hope that we will learn better until the next epidemic.